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Abstract—The emergence of distributed ledger technolo-
gies in the vehicular applications’ arena is decisively con-
tributing to their improvement and shaping of the public
opinion about their future. The Tangle is a technology
at its infancy, but showing enormous potential to become
a key solution by addressing several of the blockchain’s
limitations. This paper focuses on the use of the Tangle
to improve the security of both in-vehicle and off-vehicle
functions in vehicular applications. To this end, key opera-
tional performance parameters are identified, evaluated and
discussed with emphasis on their limitations and potential
impact in future vehicular applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has been fertile for vehicular re-
search. Electrical vehicles became a reality and a trend
due to the tightening of pollutant emission legislation.
Vehicles became autonomous and (wireless) commu-
nications have evolved to provide connectivity with
quality of service and flexibility tailored to enable such
applications (e.g., through 5G slicing). Today it is not
difficult to conceive a world where families do not
own cars, but are transported by them in an intelligent
fashion. A world where car fleets manage themselves
according to the foreseen usage and where cars transport
people from their homes to work so as to avoid all
possible energy waste and maximize profitability of
their owners while providing maximum comfort and
added experiences to its users.
The future of transport and mobility will surely be
enabled by autonomous vehicles encompassing sens-
ing capabilities that can cooperate with each other
and share their sensing resources and perspective with
the nearby infrastructures and neighboring vehicles.
However, many challenges remain ahead regarding
key aspects such as security, privacy and anonymity.
Anonymity, as the ability to share information without
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disclosing the identity of its producer, is particularly
relevant when dealing with the location of vehicles,
for example, where pseudonyms are typically used to
avoid exposing the identity of the vehicle that would
otherwise allow collecting information about its location
or traveled routes. Privacy deals with the ability to
keep the data private, i.e., of ensuring that even if
someone gets access to the raw data he/she cannot
make sense of it. For example, communications among
people in different vehicles via the infotainment system
must be conducted so as to guarantee that only the
authorized people are able to listen and participate
in the conversations. Finally, security is the ability to
avoid threats that can compromise the system. A secure
system ensures that user access rules are enforced and
that mechanisms are in place to avoid attacks from
endanger the security of people (e.g., passengers in
vehicles and/or pedestrians on the road).
The security of vehicles can be classified in two
operational domains: in-vehicle and off-vehicle. The
first case encompasses functions that are intrinsically
running inside the vehicle. Examples of safety critical
functions in this context are steering, breaking, local-
ization and environment sensing. These can be used
to support autonomous driving and, therefore, must
fulfill stringent dependability and security requirements.
Other functions such as infotainment, acclimatization,
air quality have less stringent requirements because,
although having the potential to negatively impact the
user experience on-board, they are less likely to en-
danger human lives. These are considered functions
with mission critical security requirements. The second
case, off-vehicle security, encompasses functions that
are externally made available to the vehicle and that can
be used to complement its own in-vehicle functions. A
typical example of such a function is the cooperative
sensing and perception shared among vehicles using
CAMs and DENMs. Off-vehicle functions have typi-
cally mission critical security requirements.
In the last years, there has been numerous reports of
hacking of in-vehicle systems. In 2015, Charlie Millerc⃝2018 IEEE
and Chris Valasek have demonstrated that they could
take control over the Internet of a Jeep Cherokee’s
entertainment system by meddling with the dashboard
functions, steering, brakes, and transmission, all from
a laptop that could be anywhere in the world [3]. In
2016, researchers from Chinas Zhejiang University and
from a Chinese security firm named Qihoo 360 have
proved that it is possible to jam multiple sensors on a
Tesla Model S making objects invisible to its navigation
system [1], something that can severely jeopardize its
autonomous navigation functions. Recently, in April this
year, Daan Keuper and Thijs Alkemad revealed that
it is possible to hack a Volkswagen Golf GTE and
an Audi A3 Sportback e-tron via a Wi-Fi connection
[4]. In their demonstration, they gained access to the
In-Vehicle Infotainment system, which allow them to
listen to conversations in the vehicle through the car kit,
access the address book and the conversation history,
besides tracking the location of the vehicle and past
history based on the navigation system. More recently in
May, 14 vulnerabilities have been discovered in BMW
vehicles, 6 of them providing remote access to the
car via the wireless Bluetooth and cellular network
interfaces [2].
Vehicular applications have been pushing research
efforts and standardization initiatives leading to the arise
of several security protocols and Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) architectures. The most relevant ones are
the IEEE Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) 1609.2 [6] (USA) and ETSI ITS Security
Standards (Europe) [7]. Due to the relative early status
of adoption of these standards and slow emergence of
cooperative sensing applications, no accounts of secu-
rity breaches have been yet reported to the best of our
knowledge. Nevertheless, efforts are being conducted
in this domain, both in terms of characterizing the per-
formance of standard security mechanisms [8] as well
as proposing new security solutions that complement
existing standards [9].
Over the last few years the blockchain technology has
managed to attract immense attention due to intrinsic
properties such as trustless operation, immutability,
transparency, easy verification, cryptographic security,
auditability and independence of third parties [10].
Blockchain is perceived has having the potential to per-
form a radical change in several sectors, most notably
in those where it can harness synergies with emerging
technologies such as machine learning, artificial intel-
ligence, autonomous driving and fog computing [11].
However, the adoption of public blockchain technolo-
gies presents several drawbacks that must be carefully
considered [5].
This paper addresses the use of the IOTA Distributed
Ledger Technology (DLT) [20] to cope with the short-
comings of existing public blockchain technologies,
focusing on its timeliness to improve the security of
both in-vehicle and off-vehicle functions. Section II pro-
vides an introduction to distributed ledger technologies
with an emphasis on existing public blockchains and
IOTA. In the first case, an overview of representative
blockchain applications is provided. In the second case,
an introduction to the IOTA cryptocurrency is docu-
mented. Section III describes the setup used to collect
relevant performance data about the Tangle, the results
and their discussion. Finally, Section IV concludes this
paper and provides future work directions.
II. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGIES
In the last few years we have been assisting a rise in
the adoption of Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs)
in the vehicular domain. In this section an overview of
public blockchain applications to vehicular communi-
cations is provided. Furthermore, as a promising DLT
that aims at solving the blockchain’s shortcomings, the
Tangle operation is introduced.
A. Public Blockchain Applications
A new cryptocurrency named Bitcoin was intro-
duced in 2008 [12] encompassing a mechanism named
blockchain. The key innovation introduced by the
blockchain was the elimination of the central authority
that was responsible for guaranteeing secure and valid
exchanges while being liable when that did not occur.
A public decentralized peer-to-peer ledger system was
introduced where all transactions reside in a distributed
database (blockchain data structure) and are validated
by all peers in the network via a consensus protocol.
A blockchain can be viewed both as an information
and communications technology aimed at managing the
ownership of assets and of the related rights/obligations
and as a mechanism to “to decentralize the governance
structures used to coordinate people and economic
decision making” [11].
The vehicular ecosystem offers a broad diversity of
opportunities to capitalize on the benefits provided by
blockchain technologies. Regarding certificate manage-
ment, existing solutions to secure inter-vehicle commu-
nications mainly rely on the use of digital certificates
for authentication, whose validation must be performed
within a strict time bound. Not only this approach em-
bodies stringent requirements in terms of computation
power in all nodes, it also introduces a single point
of failure in the central node that issues and revokes
certificates. To cope with these limitations, several pro-
posals have been put forward to manage certificates [13]
and keys [15] in distributed and immutable records, and
supervise remote software updates or provide dynamic
insurance fees [14].
Another application domain that is becoming popular
for adopting blockchain technologies is the management
of trust in a vehicular networks. This domain stemmed
from the idea that the data’s credibility can be estimated
by analyzing the past behavior of its producers. In one
example the blockchain system is used to rate vehicles
that participate in a network by analyzing the received
message sensing content, performing its perceptual val-
idation and globally establishing the credibility of its
issuer [16]. A mechanism addressing the same goal has
been proposed by [17]. In this case, a trust parameter
named Trust Bit is employed to provide information
regarding the messages’ level of trust as perceived by
the vehicle network.
One major issue in vehicular networks is the lack
of “motivation” to forward announcements among ve-
hicles. This occurs due to the absence of incentives to
compensate the energy expenditure and computational
resources involved in the operation. To overcome this
issue two solutions have been proposed in [18] and [19].
These solutions stimulate the cooperation of vehicles for
the task of relaying messages.
As discussed, an increasing number of vehicular ap-
plications are adopting public blockchain technologies.
However, their use brings multiple concerns that must
be carefully considered, namely their reliance on a
private key, immutability, bias towards nodes (or sets of
nodes) with very high computing power, high latency
and lack of intrinsic societal value for executing “proof-
of-work” [5]. The Tangle has been created to overcome
these shortcomings and it is presented next.
B. The Tangle
The IOTA is a cryptocurrency that was created with
a focus on the Internet of Things to solve the problems
of scalability, control centralization and post-quantum
security that characterizes other cryptocurrencies em-
ploying the blockchain technology. The Tangle is its
key contribution and builds on the concept of Directed
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) to substitute to blockchains.
In the Tangle each node is a transaction. For a trans-
action to be added to the Tangle it must approve two
other transactions by doing a small amount of “proof-
of-work”. All transactions which have not been yet
approved are called tips. A Markov Chain Monte Carlo
algorithm is used to chose the tips that will be submitted
for approval in the Tangle [20]. Starting from a random
transaction A the algorithm selects another transaction
which approves A with a bias towards the ones with
larger cumulative weight. The algorithm keeps running
until it reaches a tip. Running through transactions with
larger cumulative weight ensures that the most worthy
tips (i.e. the tips with a larger PoW) are chosen to be
approved.
Currently, the Tangle is small in size. Hence, enti-
ties with malicious intents and sufficient computational
power when compared to other users can carry out
attacks such as double-spending transactions. In this
type of attack, the attacker creates two different out-
going transactions in the same timeframe in a effort to
spend his total wallet balance two times, effectively be-
coming negative. Using sufficient computational power
the attacker could create a considerable amount of
transactions that would directly and indirectly approve
the double-spending ones thus rendering them reputable
and accepted by the Tangle network. Due to the current
small size of the Tangle anyone with sufficient com-
putational power can carry out attacks such as these.
Therefore, due to this Tangle “Beta” status, the exact
rules of tip selection are not publicly available currently.
A central node called Coordinator is given the role of
electing the tips to approve while the Tangle scale is not
large enough to guarantee its independent operation.
A transaction approved by the Coordinator is said to
be “Confirmed”. The process of electing tips to approve
occurs with a period of one minute and the result is
a transaction called “Milestone”. This transaction is
similar to any other transaction, i.e., it approves two
other transactions, but contains the Coordinator’s sig-
nature. A particular transaction is deemed “Confirmed”
if the latest Milestone enforces its approval, directly or
indirectly (there exists an approval path leading to the
latest Milestone).
Every transaction can carry a message. This allows
for two parties to communicate between each other. The
drawback is, since anyone can see every transaction
in the Tangle this type of communication is not really
feasible when the content must be kept confidential. De-
veloped by the IOTA Foundation, a messaging protocol
was introduced called Masked Authenticated Messaging
(MAM). This protocol uses the Tangle network as one
normally does, communicating by adding transactions,
but with an extra layer of encryption. Messages are
encrypted before adding the transactions on to the
Tangle. In this case only the target party (or parties)
can decode the encrypted message of the appended
transaction.
The next section describes the setup used to conduct
an evaluation of several Tangle key performance param-
eters and documents the obtained results and discussion.
III. EVALUATION
This section globally describes the used setup and
the preliminary results of the time required to append
transactions to the Tangle. This will provide the grounds
to discuss the feasibility of implementing vehicular
applications with IOTA.
A. Setup
In order to evaluate the transaction writing times in
the Tangle a basic test setup encompassing two nodes
was used: a public node at https://wallet2.iota.town:443
(Node A), hosted in Norway, and a private node (node
B) hosted in a Virtual Private Server (VPS) in Germany.
The latter was connected to the Tangle network using
the CarrIOTA Nelson project.
Regarding the hardware, the private node employs a
4 core Xeon CPU E5-2620 v3 running at 2.40GHz, with
a 12 GB RAM memory and a 300 GB SSD disk for
storage. The hardware specification of the public node
was not available at the time of writing of this paper.
Using the IOTA’s Python API, PyOTA, transactions
with payloads of different lengths were added in order
to assess their influence on the transaction writing time.
An IOTA transaction is characterized by a payload
length of 2187 trytes. If the content to be stored into the
transaction is larger than 2187 trytes, it is segmented in
two transactions added to the Tangle. In our case two
message lengths were considered: u with 1093 trytes
and m with 2405 trytes.
Three different scenarios have been considered re-
garding the Tangle performance: appending transactions
and appending Masked Authenticated Messages. Their
specific testing conditions are detailed bellow:
1) Append transactions to the Tangle: The tests were
conducted in two phases. In the first, a set of 100
trials was conducted and the overal delay of adding
these transactions to the tangle was measured. In the
second phase, also for a set of 100 trials, in order to
better understand the delays experienced at each stage
of the transaction creation, the delay measurement was
segmented in terms of its “tip selection”, “attach to
tangle” and “broadcast” operations.
2) Append MAMs to the Tangle: The tests were con-
ducted for a set of 100 trials by measuring the overall
delay of appending a Masked Authenticated Message
to the Tangle segmented in terms of its “encoding”,
“tip selection”, “attach to tangle”,“broadcast” and “get
message” operations.
B. Results
The collected results are organized according to the
previous identified scenarios: appending transactions
and appending Masked Authenticated Messages.
1) Append transactions to the Tangle: The box-
and-whisker plot of the global delay for attaching a
transaction to the Tangle is documented in Fig. 1. As
expected, for both nodes (A and B), the message with
the highest length (m) is characterized by an higher
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Fig. 1: Time distribution for adding a message u of size
1093 trytes and a message m of size 2405 trytes using
a public node A and our private node B.
median delay to be added to the Tangle due to the
segmentation of that message in two transactions. Also,
the likely range of variation (the interquartile range or
IQR) is more compact for message u for the same
reason.
Regarding the variation in the delay as a function of
the node to which the transaction is added, considering
message m, node B exhibits a clear improved timing
performance when compared to node A. This result
can be justified by the comparatively reduced load in
transaction requests that the private node B experiences.
This gain is not so evident when performing transac-
tions with u messages.
Also represented on Fig. 1 are several transaction
attachment delay outliers. These can have multiple
causes, being the most likely one the occurrence of
highly challenging “proof-of-work” cases.
To get a deeper understanding of the timings con-
tributing to the overall delay in the transaction attach-
ment to the Tangle, this procedure can be divided in
three stages. First one needs to figure out which two
transactions are going to be approved. This is done by
running the tip selection algorithm two times. Secondly,
for a transaction to be added to the Tangle, some “proof-
of-work” must be carried out. The duration of this
process has a high variance due to the randomness
of finding a suitable nonce. Lastly, the transaction
must be broadcasted to the network. The Cumulative
Distribution Functions (CDF) of the latency experienced
in these three phases are plotted for messages u (1093
trytes) and m (2405 trytes) in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
In both cases, what has an higher impact on the over-
all transaction insertion delay is the “attach to tangle”
component corresponding to the “proof-of-work” that
needs to be carried out in each transaction. The second
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Fig. 2: CDF of the latency experienced during the multiple phases of adding a message u of size 1093 trytes to
the Tangle using the public node A and our private node B.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.3 1.0 10.0 100.0
t (s)
CD
F stage1. tip selection
2. attach to tangle
3. broadcast
node
A
B
Fig. 3: CDF of the latency experienced during the multiple phases of adding a message m of size 2405 trytes to
the Tangle using the public node A and our private node B.
most significant contribution to the overall delay is the
“tip selection”. The message broadcast averages around
1 second and, therefore, is negligible when compared
to the other contributions.
A comparison between Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 reveals an
expected behavior: the “proof-of-work” of m messages
exhibit a significant delay increase when compared u
messages. For example, considering the private node B,
25% of all message m transactions experience a “attach
to tangle” delay bellow 11 s, while the same is true for
75% all transactions encompassing message u.
The option for using the public node A or the
private node B also affects the delays experienced in the
different phases of the Tangle transaction attachment.
As shown, with the exception of the “attach to tangle”
phase, where the delays on both nodes have closer
values, there is a noticeable delay variation regarding
the “tip selection” and “broadcast” phases. In the former
phase, for shorter messages u, this delay is generally
smaller in the public node, while the opposite is true
for larger messages m.
2) Append MAMs to the Tangle: As previously in-
troduced, MAMs differ from regular transactions by
being encrypted before their inclusion into the Tangle.
In this sense, the end-to-end delay of attaching a MAM
transaction and reading its content involves several
stages, namely: “encoding”, “tip selection”, “attach to
tangle”, “broadcast” and “get message”. The first and
the last stage have not yet been introduced. The first,
as the name suggests, corresponds to the encryption of
the message via a private key. The last is the delay of
reading a specific MAM.
Fig. 4 illustrates the latency CDF for each stage
of the process of adding and fetching a MAM. As
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Fig. 4: CDF of the latency taken at each stage of the process of adding and fetching a message using the Masked
Authenticating Messaging protocol.
documented, the “tip selection” and “attach to tangle”
phases are, as in regular transactions, the dominant
contributors to the overall delay. The message encoding
is conducted with a delay of around 380 milliseconds in
average. Both the “broadcast” and “get message” stages
have also negligible jitter and exhibit average delays of
approximately 650 milliseconds and 950 milliseconds,
respectively.
C. Discussion
The above results show that the attachment of trans-
actions to the tangle can be realized with a relatively
low delay when compared to blockchains. The observed
performance is set to enable vehicular applications with
the benefits of the IOTA distributed ledger technology.
At the current “Beta” stage of the Tangle technol-
ogy, the transactions addressed in this paper were not
immediately Confirmed by the Coordinator. Indeed,
many of them took a long time to be Confirmed.
Despite the existence of mechanisms to promote a faster
confirmation, the lack of direct or indirect approval
by a “Milestone” can represent a security risk (e.g.,
double-spending) for any transaction. This risk can be
circumvented by employing MAM messages among
trusted parties.
One observation emerging from the results is that the
overall delay of attaching transactions and MAMs to
the Tangle is highly influenced by the “tip selection”
algorithm and from the “proof-of-work” required in the
process. The tip selection algorithm can be changed
to become faster, although at the expense of inserting
transactions in branches with less cumulative weigh
and, therefore, with less probability of being validated
by the network.
Regarding the “proof-of-work”, it has been demon-
strated in [21] that a delay of 300 milliseconds for this
phase is feasible using a Raspberry Pi together with
an FPGA. Such approach can be adopted to reduce
the delay for this task by approximately one order of
magnitude.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented the Tangle as a possible solu-
tion to address the shortcomings of public blockchain
technologies for vehicular applications. In this sense,
the application context and a review of key vehic-
ular research contributes was presented, as well as
an introduction to the Tangle technology. The paper
identified key operational performance parameters that
were evaluated and discussed. The conclusion is that the
Tangle exhibits smaller transaction delays than existing
public blockchains. Another conclusion is that the per-
formance of encrypted Masked Authenticated Messages
exhibits a performance comparable with regular Tangle
transactions. This will enable the support of privacy
in vehicular communications with negligible latency
overhead.
Future work will be focused on extending the pre-
sented analysis by realizing a larger set of trials (1000)
per performance parameter in order to gain further in-
sight and corroborate the observed results. Mechanisms
for shortening the “proof-of-work” and tip selection de-
lays will be researched with focus on embedded systems
that can be easily adapted for vehicular applications.
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